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Aided by strong economic growth the Singapore government has been able to keep both 
the tax rate and the government expenditure rate low and yet generate healthy budget 
surpluses year after year. Although the gap between the tax rate and the government 
expenditure rate is the obvious source of the surplus, this paper shows the presence of 
another subtle source, a surplus generated by conservative growth forecasts that lay the 
base for revenue projections. An omitted variable bias in a model based on the tax 
smoothing hypothesis led us to consider the role played by the growth forecast error in 
predicting the budget surplus. Our computations show that on average the under-
prediction of the tax base (GDP) must have contributed about $376 million per year to the 
realized budget surplus over the period 1990-2005. This appears to be simply a by-
product of the Government’s philosophy of “fiscal prudence”.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The public sector has played a pivotal role in the economic and social progress of 
Singapore. Nevertheless, the Keynesian advocacy of deficit financing had no role in 
Singapore’s fiscal policy operations. Instead, perhaps driven by Confucian ethics of thrift 
and frugality, the Singapore government has stayed lean relative to the size of the 
economy
1 and managed to secure healthy budget surpluses in many good years. These 
surpluses have yielded a robust fiscal position for Singapore with total public assets 
standing at $437 billion by the end of March 2005.
2 
 
In recent years, however, the budget balance has not been that favourable due to volatile 
economic conditions, lowered income and corporate tax rates and the emergence of new 
spending priorities (Budget Speech, 2006). The introduction of “special transfer” 
programs has especially added to the reduction of the surplus. For example, the planned 
$3.59 billion “Progress Package” that included growth dividends, workfare bonuses, 
national service bonuses and CPF top-ups led to a projected $2.86 billion deficit in 2006. 
Without the Progress Package the projected budget balance was a surplus of $ 0.73 billion. 
 
Analysts, however, have drawn a distinction between the reported budget balance and the 
actual budget balance. The difference arises from a conservative accounting method that 
the government has adopted on the revenue side of the budget (Asher, 2002, 2003). Two 
major items are excluded from the budget. One is receipts from the sale of land and other 
capital goods. The volatile nature of these receipts is the reason for not considering them 
                                                 
1 In Singapore, government consumption and investment expenditures have constituted about 10 and 4 
percent of GDP respectively over 1990-2005. Over the same period the percentage of government 
consumption spending alone was 20 in Canada, 20 in the U.K., 16 in Japan, and 16 in the U.S.  
2 Financial Statements for the Financial Year 2004/2005, Accountant-General Department.    3
as a regular revenue component. The other item is the net investment income (NII)
3 
generated by investing government reserves. As a constitutional requirement only up to 
50% of the NII can be included in current revenues and the rest has to be protected as past 
reserves. The contention is that these are government revenue items and be part of the 
budget account. As reported in the local news papers they would turn the apparent deficit 
in 2006 into a handsome surplus.
4  
 
The objective of this exercise is not to dwell so much in the accounting methods but to 
bring out a less known source of the budget surplus, a surplus attributable to conservative 
growth forecasts that the government has adopted in making the budget projections. Since 
budget estimates are based on a predicted GDP growth rate any systematic forecast error 
in the growth rate should be reflected in the realized budget balance. We try to quantify 
this relationship and assess the amount of the budget surplus that can be attributed to 
conservative growth forecasts. Since there is no theoretical basis for such a relationship 
our exercise is essentially an attempt to establish a missing link in a regression model on 
tax smoothing.  
 
2. Methodology 
We adopt Barro’s (1979, 1981, 1986) tax smoothing model to arrive at a regression model 
that can be used to examine the relationship between budget surplus and growth forecast 
errors. Under Barro’s tax smoothing formulation the government tries to spread the 
                                                 
3 NII is defined as the interest and dividend income earned from investing Government's reserves, net of 
debt servicing costs and expenses on investment. It does not include any capital gains or losses arising from 
the disposal of investments. (http://app.mof.gov.sg/faq) 
4 See, for example,  the article “Near $3b budget gap sparks fresh debate” by Narendra Aggarwal in the The 
Straits Times, 27 Feb. 2006. 
   4
deadweight loss of taxation over time by choosing a smooth path for the tax rate. In other 
words, unexpected rises in government expenditures are financed not by raising the tax 
rate, but by issuing bonds. The optimization problem involved here leads to the 
hypothesis that the tax rate is constant under certainty or the expected tax rate is the same 
as the current tax rate under uncertainty. Subsequently there have been many attempts to 
test the implications of tax smoothing on the budget balance. Bohn (1998) used Barro’s 
(1986) formulation to examine the response of primary budget surplus to debt-income 
ratio. Studies such as Huang and Lin (1993), Ghosh (1995), Olekalns (1997), Serletis and 
Schorn (1999), Cashin et al. (2002), Kula (2004) and Fisher and Kingston (2005) examine 
whether the fiscal deficit is informative of future changes in government expenditures.  
 
It would be instructive to begin with Barro’s (1986) basic formulation and then move on 
to formulate a regression model. Here we present the model in discrete time units instead 
of the mixed continuous-discrete time frame that Barro adopted. From the one period 
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where τ is the average tax rate,
5 Y is real income or output (the tax base), r is the average 
real rate of return on capital, G is real government expenditure excluding interest 
payments, and B is government’s real debt stock.
6 If the tax rate is stable over time, (1) 
can be written as  
                                                 
5 The tax rate is defined broadly as the revenue-income ratio. 
6 We could write the condition in (1) as expected present values and work out the derivations as in 
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Assuming that Y and G grow at the same rate (μ) in the long-run, the trend values of Y and 
G can be written as 
** (1 )
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The overall government budget surplus at time t can be written as 
1 ()
ff
tt t t tt SY Y YG r B ττ − =+− − −                                                                     (4) 
where the first right-hand term represents the projected tax revenue and the second term is 
the change in the tax revenue resulting from the income forecast error. Plugging (3) into 
(4) and rearranging the terms we obtain: 
**
12 1 () ( ) ()
ff
tt t t tt tt SY Y Y Y G GB γγ μ − =− + − − − − .                                             (5) 
where  1 γ =
**
1 (() ) / tt t Gr BY μ − +−   represents the trend government expenditure rate 
including interest payments net of the growth effect. In (5) we allow for the possibility 
21 γ γτ =+  such that it can be expressed in a regression format as follows:   6
**
01 2 3 14 () () ()
f
tt t t t t t t t SY Y G G B Y Y β βββ βε − =+ − + − + + − + .                      (6) 
In (6)  11 0 β γ =>  should estimate the average government expenditure rate. Obviously 
the trend government expenditure rate should be approximately constant for the 
formulation in (6) to be meaningful.
7 We also expect  2 1 β = −  and  3 0 β < ; the magnitude 
of the latter provides an estimate of the long run growth rate. Having controlled for these 
effects,  4 0 β >  captures the effect of output forecast errors on the surplus.  
 
Model (6) embodies very explicit theoretical implications which can easily be tested. If 
income forecasts are correct or the forecast errors are purely random then (6) reduces to 
**
01 2 3 1 () () tt t t t t t SY Y G G B β βββ ε − =+ − + − + + .     (7) 
If we try to test the tax smoothing hypothesis within the Singapore context by testing its 
implications embodied in (7) we would be led to rejecting the hypothesis. This prompted 
us to suspect the presence of an omitted variable bias in the regression coefficients and to 
consider growth forecast errors as the possible missing variable from the model. This was 
the basis for the formulation in (6).  
 
3. Data Sources 
The sample period of this study runs from 1990 to 2005. We limit our study to this period 
because data on growth forecasts are traceable only back to 1990. Actual and projected 
data for government revenue and its components, government expenditure and its 
components and budget surplus are from the annual Budget Speech and Budget 
Statements published by the Ministry of Finance, Singapore. Projected GDP growth rates 
                                                 
7  We observe this is to be the case in Singapore since early 1990s.   7
are from the Budget Speech for the period 1997-2005 and from Singapore Public Finance 
Press Clippings for the period 1990-1996. Nominal GDP and the GDP deflator (base 
2000) are from the Singapore Time Series (STS) database. Public debt is from the IMF 
International Statistical Yearbook.  
 
4. Accounting Method and Budget Surplus 
It would be useful to estimate the model in (6) using both the reported budget surplus and 
adjusted surpluses since Singapore’s budgetary account system is not very similar to the 
standard IMF system (Asher, 2002, 2003). In Singapore’s budget accounts, government 
revenue consists of tax revenue, fees and charges, net investment income (NII) 
contributions and other revenues. Tax revenue consists of income taxes (both corporate 
and personal income taxes as a single item), asset taxes, custom and excise taxes, motor 
vehicle taxes, goods and service taxes and other taxes. Nearly 50 percent of the tax 
revenue comes from corporate and personal income taxes. A bulk of the income from fees 
and charges comes from licences and permits, rental receipts, service fees, sales of goods 
and fines and forfeitures. Government expenditure constitutes operating expenditure, 
special transfers and development expenditures. Operating expenditures are mainly 
classified as running costs and transfers. Running costs include expenditure on manpower, 
supplies and services, equipment, military expenditures and grants-in-aid. Expenditure on 
transfers includes social transfers and subventions. The government has exercised special 
transfer schemes since early 1990s to redistribute a part of its accumulating surpluses. 
Development expenditures are spending on direct development projects, capital grants 
and other capital injections.  
   8
As stated earlier the reported budget surplus does not include the full amount of the net 
investment income and omits the receipts from the sales of lands and other capital goods. 
These two items are the most volatile revenue components. The coefficient of variation of 
the growth rates of investment and interest income and capital receipts over our sample 
period was 30% and 41% respectively as opposed to only 2.4% for income tax revenues.
8 
It is therefore prudent not to consider them as regular revenue streams in setting the 
expenditure targets. However, their realized amounts could be made available for 
budgetary purposes.  Since the government is considering a constitutional change for this 
purpose, it would be useful to examine government’s financial position with and without 
these items.  
 
We consider two possible adjusted surpluses. One is where the full amount of capital 
receipts is made available as a revenue item with no change to the NII contribution rule. 
The second is where the full amounts of both capital receipts and NII are made available 
to the budget. Since the data on total NII is not available, we use investment and interest 
income net of interest payment on government debt as a proxy for NII. We have to 
caution the reader that this proxy may over-estimate the NII by a fare margin. The 
computations for 2005 are shown in Table 1 and Figure 1 plots the reported and adjusted 
surplus series for the whole sample period. Obviously the adjusted surpluses are markedly 
higher than the reported surplus. Although the reported surplus varies from -2 to 8 percent 
of GDP over 1990-2005 the adjusted surplus1 remains positive and varies from 0.4 to 17 
percent of GDP and the adjusted surplus2 varies from 3 to 19 percent of GDP. The mean 
                                                 
8  The following number pairs show the mean and the standard deviation of the growth rates (%) of the 
major revenue components; the items are ordered by the standard deviation: income tax (4.24, 0.10), Other 
tax (4.99, 0.12), fees and charges (1.69, 0.22), Others (2.29, 0.23), investment and interest income (0.93, 
0.28), capital receipts (0.99, 0.41).   9
values of the reported and the two adjusted budget surpluses are 3, 8 and 11 percent of 
GDP respectively. Based on these figures one could go to the extreme and recommend 
using up capital receipts and NII fully for budgetary purposes. However, the 
government’s dilemma would be how to strike a balance between strengthening and 
protecting the country’s reserve position and maintaining a healthy budget balance.  
 
Table 1: Budget surplus, reported and adjusted – 2005 
  Budget item  $ billion 
  Revenue        
       1.   Tax revenue 
       2.   Fees and charges 
       3.   Net investment income (NII) contribution
(a) 
       4.   Investment and interest income 
               (i)   Interest on investment and bank deposits 
               (ii)  Dividends  
               (iii) Interest on loans
(b) 
       5.   Capital receipts
(c) 
       6.   Other 
 
  Expenditure  
       7.   Operating expenditure 
       8.   Special transfers  
       9.   Interest payments on govt. debt 
       10. Development expenditure 
 
  Budget surplus (revenue-expenditure)               
       11. Reported budget surplus [(1+2+3+6)-(7+8+10)] 
       12. Adjusted budget surplus1 [(1+2+3+5+6)-(7+8+10)]  
       13. Adjusted budget surplus2 [(1+2+4+5+6)-(7+8+9+10)]  
 
25.04 
  2.30 
  2.67 
  7.39 
  2.04   
  3.57 
  1.78 
  5.12  
  0.14 
 
 
21.59                    
0.88                    
0.20 
 7.25 
    
   
 0.43 
5.54 
        10.07
d 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Singapore. 
Notes: (a) Only up to 50 percent of total NII is included in this item. (b) Prior to the Constitutional 
amendments to protect 50% of NII in FY2000, interest on development loans was classified as 
“Other”.  (c) Capital receipts include revenue from sales of land and capital goods and other 
capital receipts. Sale of land is the largest component (nearly 90 percent) of capital receipts. (d ) 
This may have overestimated NII contributions. 
   10
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Figure 1: Reported and adjusted budget surplus, $ billion 
Source: Based on data from the Ministry of Finance, Singapore. 
 
5. Forecast Error and Budget Surplus 
To estimate the model in (6) we need measures of the trend series 
* Y , 
* G  and the forecast 
series 
f Y . For the first two we use Kalman-filtered smooth series obtained from the 
STAMP package. As for the forecast series, we computed one-year ahead forecasts as 
11 (1 )
ff
tt t YY μ ++ =+ , where  1
f
t μ +  is the government’s predicted GDP growth rate for the year 
ahead. Instead of a point-forecast, the government provides a range-forecast for the 
growth rate. We, therefore, computed three forecast GDP series, lower bound (
, f LB Y ), 
upper bound (
, f UB Y ), and the average or the mid-point (
, f AV Y ) forecasts.  
 
Table 2 provides the government’s forecast growth rates, observed growth rates and the 
forecast error (
, f AV YY − ) based on the average of the lower and upper bounds. We can 
see from the table that when the economy was growing along a trend line between 1990 
and 1997 even the upper bounds of the government growth forecasts were mostly below 
the observed growth rates. These conservative forecasts have under-predicted GDP by    11
$2.1 billion on average per year. The picture changes when the economy entered the 
turbulent period after 1997. Obviously forecasting is far more difficult during turbulent 
periods compared to steadily trending periods. Even then the average forecast error was a 
positive $1.1 billion. Over the whole period the forecast error was about $1.6 billion per 
year. In other words, the actual tax base was higher by about $1.6 billion per year 
compared to the projected one. 
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Notes: Forecast GDP growth rate is from the annual Budget Speech. Forecast error is computed 
using the average of lower and upper bound projections.  
 
 
Table 3 provides the regression estimates based on Model (6) and the reported budget 
surplus deflated by the GDP deflator. The first column of the table shows the regression 
estimates without the forecast error term (
f YY − ). In this case the coefficient of the 
output gap (
* YY − ) substantially over estimates the average government expenditure rate 
of about 15 percent observed over 1991-2005. The coefficient of the expenditure gap 
(
* GG − ) is also much larger in magnitude than the expected value of unity. The 
coefficient of the debt variable ( 1 t B − ) is, however, not too far off from the average GDP 
growth rate of about 6.5 percent observed over the sample period. Unless one suspects an 
omitted variable bias, the first two estimates would be taken as evidence against the tax   12
smoothing model. As we correctly suspected, however, adding the forecast error into the 
regression brings these estimates very close to their expected values and remain robust 
regardless of the type of forecast error used in the regression.  
 
Before discussing the results further it would be worthwhile to draw attention to Figure 2 
which plots the recursive estimates of the coefficients of Model 4 in Table 3. As we can 
see these estimates settle down to constants remarkably well. The diagnostics reported in 
Table 3 are also highly satisfactory. The regressions 2-4 in Table 3 explain about 93 
percent of the variation of the reported budget surplus and the fitted values track the 
turning points of the surplus series very closely (the graph is omitted for brevity). 
 
The similarity of the regression estimates of Models 2-4 in Table 3 is remarkable. The 
statistical significance of the forecast error coefficient clearly indicates the presence of 
systematic forecast errors. After controlling for the output gap, expenditure gap and 
public debt, the GDP forecast error can explain about 13 percent of the variation of the 
budget surplus. Although the estimated coefficient of 0.24 is slightly above the average 
tax rate of 0.2 observed over the sample period, it captures some data regularities that are 
not captured by the other coefficients. It indicates that a $1 change in the forecast error 
has contributed 24 cents on average to the surplus. This translates to about $376 million 
surplus per year that is attributable to about $1.6 billion under-prediction of the GDP.  
 
Replicating the above exercise with the adjusted budget surpluses proved less promising. 
This is a result of the high volatility of capital receipts and investment and interest income 
that are less correlated with the predictor variables in the model.     13
 
6. Conclusion 
“Fiscal prudence has been the hallmark of Singapore’s economic management. We must 
never fall into the trap of structural budget deficits…” declared the Minister of Finance in 
his 2004 Budget Speech. This philosophy is well reflected in the accounting method and 
the revenue projection method that the government has adopted. The former has been 
geared towards enhancing and protecting the country’s reserve position and the latter, 
perhaps inadvertently, provided the government with a buffer surplus. Although 
“conservative growth forecasting” may not sound right, to err on the conservative side is 
an obvious choice even the individuals and firms make. The forecast error in an overly 
optimistic forecast may translate into a huge budget deficit. The caution in government 
revenue projections will become even more imperative as the gap between the average 
tax rate and the government expenditure rate narrows further.  
 
   14
Table 3. Determinants of budget surplus  
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 DW   1.73  1.61  1.44  1.52 
 Reg. F   14.68 {0.000}  35.22 {0.000}  33.05 {0.000}  34.33 {0.000} 
 AR(1) F   0.159 {0.698}  0.080 {0.783}  0.245 {0.632}  0.155 {0.703} 
 ARCH F   0.363 {0.562}  0.012 {0.916}  0.061 {0.810}  0.011 {0.920} 
 Normality Chi
2   2.818 {0.244}  0.201 {0.904}  0.285 {0.866}  0.189 {0.910} 
 RESET F   0.026 {0.875}  0.904 {0.366}  0.121 {0.735}  0.434 {0.526} 
Note: Effective sample period is 1991- 2005. In parentheses below the estimates are t-values. * and ** 
denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels (one-tail tests except the constant term). p-values of 
diagnostic test statistics are given in braces.  
, fU B Y , 
, fL B Y , and 
, fA V Y are  GDP forecast upper bound, 
lower bound and the average of the two.    
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